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BOOK IEVIFWS
JURAL RELATIONS. By Albert Kocourek, Professor of Law,
Northwestern University, with an Introduction by John H.
Wigmore. Indianapolis, Ind. The Bobbs-Merrill Company.
pp. xx, 482 (1928).
This is an extraordinary book. On first leafing it through
one gets the impression of a treatise in advanced mathematics.
The bitterness and hate of contested litigation are reduced to
algebraic formulae. We find that there is a certain basic re-
latioiship between the body of rules of the law and the social
activities upon which these rules operate, just as there is a rela-
tionship between the earth and a falling body which is pulled to-
ward it by the force of gravitation.
It further appears that the relationship of the law and social
activities can be as scientifically studied and as exactly set out
in mathematical formula as the law of gravitation operating
upon falling objeets. There is, in brief, a science of jural re-
lations as definitely descriptive as the science of physics. The body
of legal rules operates in various ways upon A and B, not in a
haphazard manner but in a way which can be expressed by
mathematical symbols, plus and minus signs, brackets and radi-
cals. These definite relations are also capable of classification,
and to express this classification a new and very difficult terminol-
ogy has been invented. Taking a few of them at random there
are conjunctive and disjunctive jural relations, polarized and un-
polarized relations, mesonomic and zygnomic, prevenient and
postvenient relations, and countless others. Most of these re-
lations are expressed by mathematical formulae or graphs.
,Strange and outlandish terms appear and reappear. The
terminology becomes increasingly more complex as the book
progresses. A complete new vocabulary, built on logical and
systematical lines, emerges. When the book is completed if the
reader has been able to follow its logical scheme the various possi-
ble jural relationships have been dissected, classified, named and
thrust into appropriate pigeonholes, just as plants are named in
herbarium.
It is easy for the practical man to make fun of such a book
as this, bristling as it does with weird, quaint and occult terminol-
ogy. The book will have to face much criticism of this type.
That, however, is the inevitable fate of any philosophical work
which is called to the attention of people who do not understand
it. It is not fair criticism.
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The author of this work has done something which requires
real genius to accomplish. Whether it has any practical use or
not is another question. Even if it is of no more practical sig-
nificance than a system of non-Euclidean geometry that, never-
theless, cannot detract from the credit which is due such a com-
prehensive piece of logical analysis, for if the book is read with
understanding it becomes apparent that once you have granted
the author's premises the logical development from these premises
is a work of extraordinary ability.
The fundamental premises of the book, however, are difficult for
the present reviewer to accept. They may be stated as follows:
(1) Legal phenomena, according to Mr. Kocourek, involve three
elements, a system of potential legal rules existing in the abstract,
potentially, awaiting application. (2) The second element is the
situation of fact on which the rules operate. (3) The third ele-
ment is the connecting link between the rules and social activities
which they control. This element is called by the author, jural
relations.
If law were only as simple as that it could be reduced to ai
exact science, but we fear that it isn't. The idea of rules existing
in the abstract is a comforting one to a theologian, but to our
mind it has no reality. -Courts decide cases and courts are eora-
posed of individuals. What makes them decide these cases thb
way they do is as mysterious as the cause of any decision in
human conduct. Logical systems and legal creeds are the tools
which courts use in making their decision. Sometimes these sys-
tems are the cause of the result, sometimes they simply justify a
result which has been reached on different grounds. These sys-
tems do not exist in the abstract to any greater extent than that
they may indicate a certain habit of thought and language tech-
nique on the part of the judges.
Economic ideas, moral ideas and inevitable prejudices are fully
as important in determining what the law is to be as any logical
creed. If this is so then the law is not an exact science and any
logical system such as the author of this book sets up must be
judged by its utility in deciding cases. It will be useful only as
it is simply and easily understandable. Our objection to the sys-
tem set forth by Mr. Kocourek is that while it is a very ingenious-
ly constructed logical machine it is entirely too difficult to operate.
-T. W. ARNOLD.
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